The foreign policy turnaround of Vučić’s regime, like the one that occurred at the time of the signing of the Brussels agreements, could pay off for him again this time, in the form of even better relations that he would establish with EU member states. Of course, the support of the west would also mean consciously tolerating the undemocratic, autocratic manners of the government in its internal policies.
In a geostrategic context, Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian invasion shows the final shifting of the borders of the former Eastern Bloc further eastwards. Namely, despite rife corruption and numerous institutional vagaries of its state system, Ukraine has constituted the principles of political pluralism, freedom of choice and changes of government, which places this country in juxtaposition to the authoritarian regimes of Russia and Belarus. Regardless of the outcome of its struggle, Ukraine has – mentally and practically – already become part of Central or Eastern-Central Europe.
In this geopolitical shift, Serbia – despite its pragmatic condemnation of Russian aggression at the UN General Assembly – still essentially persists, according to its internal organisation, in following Eastern European formulas. It thus might happen that our foreign policy will soon become more favourable to the West than to Russia or China, but I don’t see any upcoming changes that would raise the Serbian system of rule of law and political freedoms and responsibilities to the level of EU standards. The foreign policy turnaround of Vučić’s regime, like the one that occurred at the time of the signing of the Brussels agreements, could once again pay off for him, in the form of even better relations that he would establish with EU member states. Of course, the support of the West would also mean consciously tolerating the undemocratic, autocratic manners of the government in its internal policies.
It might happen that our foreign policy will soon become more favourable to the west than to Russia or China, but I don’t see any upcoming changes that would raise the Serbian system of rule of law and political freedoms and responsibilities to the level of EU standards
When it comes to the influence of this conflict on changing the stances of the U.S. and Europe regarding Kosovo and the organising of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we can say that the Ukrainian crisis has homogenised the EU and the entire defence architecture of the Western world organised around NATO. I think that, under such circumstances, the U.S. and the EU won’t allow the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo to destabilise. The changes that have occurred in Montenegro clearly emphasise the West’s attitude towards declared goals of creating the so-called Serbian world by violating the territorial integrity of neighbouring states. Likewise, the existing system of international relations will not allow changes to current institutional arrangements. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot join NATO because that is opposed by the representatives of Republika Srpska; Kosovo cannot join NATO because some members of the alliance don’t recognise its independence. UN institutions are paralysed by Russia and China’s veto rights that they can deploy against any initiative coming from Western countries, and vice versa.
Some tactical changes can be achieved along the way by pressuring the so-called international community, but I think substantial changes in the region can only come from within, through a weakening of the media, strengthening of institutions and changing of the value paradigm. In Serbia, for example, it is not enough to pressure them to order “their” tabloids to suddenly stop publishing pro-Russian content or, during the covid crisis, to suddenly stop the anti-vaccination campaign.
