Serbia’s foreign policy has become a set of disparate, seemingly irreconcilable options that enable the swift implementation of alternatives, without previously prejudicing the final outcomes. It seems that this can all be absorbed in the short term. In the long term, it will put to the test Serbia’s credibility in the eyes of foreign partners and in the court of domestic support.
There are many well-founded reasons to highly rate the current foreign policy position of the Republic of Serbia. The launched (European) integration process has not been abandoned, although it has ground to a halt. The “historical rapprochement” with the U.S. is on hold, but not due to any desire or mistake of Serbia. Relations with the People’s Republic of China are on the rise, seemingly in proportion to the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Russian Federation remains a key shield to Serbia’s territorial integrity at sessions of the UN Security Council that are dedicated to the UNMIK activities. It is sometimes an extraordinary success just to maintain the status quo of an international political position, especially when it comes to a small country like Serbia.
The troubled times in which Serbia also found its aspiration to endure on the waiting list in order to vaccinate the interested population, and not only its own, has propelled this small Balkan country onto the front pages of reputable world media companies. But also subjected to the mercilessness of (unnamed) EU officials, at least according to the testimonies of politicians from our region.
Foreign policy has become a set of disparate, seemingly irreconcilable options that enable the swift implementation of alternatives, without previously prejudicing the final outcomes. Serbia’s criticised “cock-eyed” foreign policy, which is fundamentally based on the “four-pillar architecture”, is again in the public spotlight. It is bearing fruit on all sides, at least when it comes to preserving the health of the nation.
Foreign policy has become a set of disparate, seemingly irreconcilable options that enable the swift implementation of alternatives, without previously prejudicing the final outcomes
An additional step forward has been enabled with this, via the reviving of the narrative of Serbia as the “leader of the region”. It is difficult to object to the solidarity that we’ve witnessed during the previous crisis months. It also overshadowed the criticism contained in the European Parliament report or the environmental ramifications of Chinese investments, which are increasingly the topic of civic democratic participation. It seems that this can all be absorbed in the short term. In the long term, it will put to the test Serbia’s credibility in the eyes of foreign partners and in the court of domestic support.
Notwithstanding the fact that they are not nominally the largest, Chinese investments in Serbia are attracting the most attention, both from the domestic public and external competitors. According to Chinese officials, they are not of a geopolitical character. In the EU and the U.S. they wouldn’t agree with this claim. The EU has perhaps failed with vaccines, but donations have intensified. With the change of administration and the focus on domestic problems, the U.S. has lost the momentum towards the Balkans that it inherited from its predecessors, but that is far from suggesting that the arrival of America’s DFC development agency will remain a dead letter on paper. It seems that they will do everything to prevent the further growth of Chinese influence, whether that’s through investments, humanitarian diplomacy or the growing soft power that is waning.
