Rather a modern, democratic state, Serbia is more reminiscent of a postmodern feudal system – where political elites clash in an effort to improve their personal positions, before periodically reaching settlements
Whether the outcome of the elections, or everything that came afterwards, represents a pebble or a boulder in the shoe of the government depends, first and foremost, on the conduct of its opponents, and they lack winning tactics.
If the opposition lists had refused to enter the national and Belgrade assemblies, that would have posed a major problem for Vučić. A parliament without an opposition is reminiscent of the kind of undemocratic states that are stigmatised in the West, and the Serbian regime’s leader doesn’t want to be associated with their holders of power. That would only serve to expose Vučić’s quasi-democratic, authoritarian system.
Black and white forms of political relations would lead even to Vučić’s lobbyists in the EU – who have so far successfully prevented his conduct from receiving appropriate media coverage and political handling – being unable to continue sweeping what is happening in Serbia under the rug. That would then be a huge boulder for the country’s president, one that would quickly sink him to the bottom.
We will be told a lot by the verifying or rejecting of mandates, or by consenting to participate in repeat elections without drastically improving the conditions under which they are held
On the other side, the increasing certainty that the opposition will enter both assemblies represents the legalisation of the regime’s enormous election theft and consenting to future political processes continuing to unfold according to Vučić’s rules, meaning rigged elections being held for the sake of looking the part and no possibility of changing anything in the foreseeable future. Those who thus undermine the growing dissatisfaction of citizens remove even the tiniest pebble from Vučić’s shoe.
An opposition that consents to this is just as much to blame as the government for the current situation in Serbia. In such a case, it is obvious that work on ego-based combinations is being done for personal gain, with complete disregard for the public interest. Considering such a state of affairs, Serbia is more reminiscent of a postmodern feudal system – where political elites clash in an effort to improve their personal positions, before periodically reaching settlements – than a modern, democratic state.
Citizens certainly have no prospects in such a country, while political circles can profit in proportion to their unscrupulousness, even if they lack any kinds of qualities that are useful to the collective. We will see whether that is the case in just a few days, or whether a chance still exists for the political forces that are formally in opposition to Vučić to actually represent that position in the real world and aren’t just posturing.
