The post-election political scene, confronted by the certainty that it must impose at least symbolic sanctions on russia, will itself experience changes, and they will come at the level of the ruling party, the opposition and the electorate
The traditional lines of political division in post-communist European societies have changed over the last three decades, and even been overshadowed by EUropeanisation processes. The division between Euro (Atlantic) integrationists and proponents of national populist sovereignty cuts through the fields of the understanding of the nation state, democracy and the rule of law, but also economic and social development models and dilemmas around desirable recipients of subsidies and investments in infrastructure.
Serbia and its policy of manoeuvring between the influences of the EU, U.S., Russia and China is, in this regard, a special example that’s justified by the history and memory of NATO aggression, Russia’s support for Kosovo and investments coming from “brotherly China”. Over the past decade, this mantra has served a hybrid regime that’s formally pro-EU integration to ease the pressure applied on it from the West, over its many democratic shortcomings, by fuelling pro-Eastern sentiment.
The war in Ukraine and its visible consequences – imperial games around the redistribution of power, Russia’s (self) expulsion from Europe, recession in Europe and U.S. political mentorship – represent a situation that’s behind us. The policy of conditionality has almost assumed its ultimate form. Stabilocrats, who have solved little and produced a few problems in the region, have been shoved up against the wall.
The policy of manoeuvring between the influences of the EU, U.S., Russia and China, which Serbia has promoted over the past decade, is now behind us
The post-election political scene, confronted by the certainty that it must impose at least symbolic sanctions on Russia, will itself face three types of changes. President Vučić, as currently the only legal actor, will strive to ease the open external imbalance by reducing internal tensions and expressing a “readiness” for a controlled dialogue with the pro-European opposition, relying on its proverbial weakness and fragmentation. The sharing of responsibilities is becoming the government’s preferred scenario. Within the ruling party and the ruling coalition, those promoting anti-Western policies will be demoted to alternate positions, i.e., to practical invisibility. Sharp reciprocal confrontations in public, however, should not be expected.
The call for dialogue that’s in the national and state interest will practically create an additional division between realists and fundamentalists, particularly among the ranks of the opposition. Among Serbia’s citizenry, following the further rise of existential fears, apathy and political cynicism, we will reach a more noticeable political reclassification and the quest for new political favourites. And this time around they won’t be infinitely trusted.
