Sitemap

Summer & Neuroses

Despite his great international standing, Tito lacked the might to stage a Russian-American summit in Yugoslavia. Firstly, Vučić’s invitation to Trump to visit Belgrade, then recent speculation among Serbian tabloids that Biden and Putin would meet in Serbia, represent a continuation of the Serbian statesmen’s wet dream of emulating the Slovenian ideal of June 2001 – when Slovene President Milan Kučan and PM Janez Drnovšek hosted George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at the Brdo estate near Kranj. The recent Biden-Putin summit ended up being held in Geneva, despite the wishes of Serbian tabloids.

You could easily compile a collection of Biden’s “anti-Serb” statements from press clippings, but it seems that, at least in the first months, his administration hasn’t been as ultimatumminded regarding Serbian interests as one might have assumed. Admittedly, Serbia already has the default settings in place for one level of pressure.

We shouldn’t forget August 2016, when Biden reiterated in Priština that Kosovo independence is a done deal (“there is no going back”), but also advocated in favour of the formation of the famous Community of Serb Municipalities. Biden stressed in talks with then Kosovo President Thaçi that Priština would lose Washington’s support if he didn’t take the responsibility to fulfil that agreement. It would be politically rational to expect Prime Minister Albin Kurti to have just such a “responsibility” today.

Summer has arrived – in parallel with the summer holidays and the marking of ‘Srebrenica’ and ‘Operation Storm’. Here we are, three decades since Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and the narratives and identities of the ‘90s remain the decisive factor in relations in this region – a region that’s nowhere near ready to build an even remotely functional internal mechanism for quelling conflict without external mediation.

Let’s play a little game: Imagine for a moment that Yugoslavia survived and the current top political players are around. Would the main coalitions in hypothetical federal elections be: 1.) Milo Đukanović-Andrej Plenković-Ramuš Haradinaj, 2.) Aleksandar Vučić-Janez Janša-Milorad Dodik-Nikola Gruevski, 3.) Zoran Milanović-Dragan Đilas-Zoran Zaev-Tanja Fajon, 4.) Albin Kurti-Bakir Izetbegović-Miroslav Škoro? And Zdravko Krivokapić? Well, maybe a non-party federal prime minister?

The fact that there’s no Yugoslavia doesn’t necessarily mean the crisis doesn’t have a Yugoslav character. Croatia hands out lessons and places conditions on what Serbia must fulfil to gain EU membership, while I hear cynical, consolatory rationalisations from important political circles in Belgrade suggesting that it would be tough for Serbia to ever reach the position of being ready to join, and if it somehow does, they suspect Croatia would have the decisive final word on that.

For now, there can be nothing of the ‘Scandinavization’ of the region. Vučić, mirroring the ‘Belorusian model’, gave a rather rational speech about Kosovo in the Serbian Assembly (which is a marked deviation from Milošević’s policy of three decades ago), but the question is how much the MPs, who applauded him for so long, even understood him. Unlike the right-wing opposition or the useful idiots from the right in his ‘catch-all’ net, Vučić never talks about full sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo, rather about compromise and Serbian interests in Kosovo.

Certain historical parallels also impose themselves: the Treaty of Trianon was signed on 4th June 1920, in the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles, between the Allies of World War I and the Kingdom of Hungary. Due to the loss of two-thirds of their territory, the Hungarians suffer from “Trianon neurosis”, while the Serbs had “Kosovo neurosis” even before 1999 and the NATO attacks. This “Kosovo neurosis” is just one example of the collective psychological and political pathologies (neurosis) in this region. One such condition is the neurosis of “Greater Serbian hegemony”. In Zagreb, Sarajevo, Podgorica and Priština, “hegemony” is perceived as the natural state of Serbian politics, thus enabling them to excuse their nationalisms as “defensive” or, even worse, “democratic” – pro-European.

Serbian nostalgia for the ‘90s, and a relapse to those policies, help perpetuate such stereotypes.

More...

Comment by Zoran Panović

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s statement that Serbia had “travelled an impressive part of the path” towards the EU, and his encouragement (short...

Duško Lopandić Ph.D., diplomat

Dangerous Games

A policy without strategic direction resembles geopolitical Russian roulette—it erodes trust in Vučić and, in the long run, threatens Serbia’s security and international standing The...

Ivica Mladenović, Political Sociologist

With a Little Help from Our ‘Friends’

Strategic and economic interests – such as the Jadar lithium project – continues to drive EU support for stable authoritarian governance in Serbia. A...

Dr Srećko Đukić, Ambassador, Forum for International Relations, Belgrade

From One Misstepto Another – and Back Again

Tragedy lies not only in our failure to comprehend the changes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also in our continuing...

News

EBRD Backs Serbia’s Clean Air Agenda

In a move poised to reshape Serbia’s environmental trajectory, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has granted a...

Ecuador and Brazil Seal 2026 World Cup Berths as Qualification Race Heats Up

With just under two years to go until the expanded 2026 World Cup kicks off across North America, thirteen...

Eurospin Enters Serbia

The Italian discount retail chain Eurospin, through its company Eurospin EKO, is officially entering the Serbian market. According to the...

Air Serbia Adds Mykonos to Its Summer Network

Air Serbia has launched a new direct route between Belgrade and the Greek island of Mykonos, with the first...

US and China to Resume Trade Talks in London

In a high-stakes diplomatic turn, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng is set to meet top U.S. officials in London...