It seems to me that, in the short term, the pandemic will lead to an adjustment in the current patterns of the management of international problems, rather than major changes that will alter the structure of international society.
Anything other than a reliance on the theory, history and early data at our disposal would place us in the domain of irresponsibly forecasting events in an era of uncertain international relations. The force with which the COVID-19 pandemic occupied all sectors of social life and imposed new forms of crisis management justifiably leads to considerations regarding the long-term (geo)political consequences that the current crisis will generate and leave behind. And that is even the case from the perspective of the small countries of the Western Balkans. The frame of reference that I consider appropriate is contained in the question posed by Daniel Dresner. Coloured by counterfactual reasoning, the question is: what foreign policy outcomes would have looked different had it not been for the Coronavirus pandemic? The answer is: there aren’t many unknowns.
First, doubts have been renewed regarding the effectiveness of the World Health Organization’s multilateralism. It seems to me that it was intentionally forgotten that this international organisation doesn’t have the capacity to compel governments to do something. Its job of informing, advising, monitoring and providing technical assistance has not been carried out so poorly, although it is still early for a final evaluation.
The force with which the covid-19 pandemic occupied all sectors of social life and imposed new forms of crisis management justifiably leads to considerations regarding the long-term (geo)political consequences that the current crisis will generate and leave behind
Second, the election year, economic downturn and Trump’s management style in the United States, where the “Chinese virus” is to blame for almost everything, have fuelled distrust of the WHO and, at the bilateral level, China. The undemocratic management of the epidemic within China is the other side of the coin that produces similar and mostly destructive effects. Instead of creating space for discussion on potential solutions to the crisis, such a situation has caused a kind of blockade of action within the G7 and the UN Security Council, and the shifting of decision-making to state institutions. The side effects of this have been nationalism and protectionism.
In the Western Balkans, the answer to Dresner’s question would be that the changes are negligible. It seemed as though the ‘competitive generosity’ that produced a dilemma in the Serbian public – China or the EU – would have more far-reaching ramifications for Serbian foreign policy. The political outcomes of humanitarian activities have remained absent, at least for now. The situation was potentially complicated by the U.S. initiative embodied in the “Washington Document” and the announcement of a stronger economic presence, but in this case the situation is clearer: this is not a direct consequence of the pandemic. It seems to me that, in the short term, the pandemic will lead to an adjustment in the current patterns of the management of international problems, rather than major changes that will alter the structure of international society. Historically, we haven’t seen a single-cause ‘collapse’ of the system.
