A policy without strategic direction resembles geopolitical Russian roulette—it erodes trust in Vučić and, in the long run, threatens Serbia’s security and international standing
The primary motive behind Vučić’s visit was domestic. It was a means of bolstering support among his pro-Russian voters amid the deep political crisis facing the regime, a loss of legitimacy and a string of foreign policy blunders—including the unfulfilled meeting with Trump in Florida and broader, more serious diplomatic issues like ongoing negotiations with the EU and strained relations with some neighbouring countries. A secondary, more objective reason relates to Serbia’s interest in securing energy supplies (gas) and addressing the issue of sanctions against NIS. However, these matters need not have been tied to his highly controversial appearance at the military parade in Moscow— particularly at a time when Russian drones are bombing Ukrainian cities and Russia has claimed a fifth of its neighbour’s territory.
The visit will provoke varying degrees of negative reaction across the EU, depending on the member states or particular EU institutions involved (for instance, it will likely resonate more strongly within the European Parliament). Some consequences will be significant—such as the definitive (albeit informal) suspension of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations, which are massively dependent on the approval of individual member states. It is now clear that no further negotiation clusters will be opened. In effect, EU accession as a strategic goal for Serbia has been knowingly sacrificed.
Through this visit, Serbia has consciously sacrificed its EU accession goal. The EU will nevertheless continue to attempt to maintain influence over reforms in Serbia—political ones included—via pressure linked to the implementation of the Reform Agenda
On the other hand, the EU will still attempt to exert pressure through Serbia’s obligations under the Reform Agenda, in an effort to retain some degree of influence over the reform process, including political reforms (such as the appointment of REM members, electoral conditions, and so on). Access to funding from the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (€1.6 billion for Serbia by 2027) is conditioned by the implementation of these reforms, meaning the regime still has an incentive to pursue superficial, cosmetic measures that will—as before—only formally, and not substantively, demonstrate a false “commitment” to the European path.
Vučić inherited the “four pillars” policy from his democratic predecessors. It initially emerged as a response to the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, coupled with the EU’s sluggish and ineffective enlargement policy. However, Vučić has transformed its meaning, turning it into a transactional manoeuvre that could be described as “strategic omni- alignment”—a diplomatic balancing act aimed at preserving power at home and enriching the elite that controls state resources. A foreign policy of erratic zigzagging, devoid of a genuine strategic compass, represents a form of geopolitical Russian roulette in today’s chaotic world. Beyond the diminishing trust of international partners in Vučić, it ultimately undermines the security and global standing of a small country like Serbia.
