It is obvious that we will see the re-forming of many of the battalions that were disbanded over the last couple of decades, when the defence budgets of the EU’s NATO members were cut compared to gross national product and amounts of weapons in active units were reduced dramatically
France’s ambition to be an all-format power armed for independent military interventions is evident in its policies. Actual resources are limited and one example is the January 2013 intervention in the African country of Mali, where the French army embarked with heart and without allies, but was forced to seek strategic transport support from NATO after a few days. Macron, now acting as the dominant figure on the EU political scene, clearly wants to revive the traditional French penchant for shows of power that extend beyond the NATO format. That’s why it will initiate a higher level of EU independence on the defence front despite this being a programme that’s constantly on the table, though has to date been short on implementation. The main obstacle is the existence of NATO, which clearly satisfies the needs of the majority of EU members, both through guarantees of U.S. support and an effectively structured mechanism of mutual defence.
There is turbulence within the alliance, and will continue to be, but it is sustainable for now, especially in the context of the Ukraine crisis, which has consolidated relations within NATO and rendered the existence of its structures advantageous. It was on the crest of that wave that the majority of NATO members initially responded to the Russian invasion by promising to make major investments in the modernisation of the armed forces. It is obvious that many of the battalions disbanded over the last couple of decades, when the defence budgets of the EU’s NATO members were cut compared to gross national product and amounts of weapons in active units were reduced dramatically, will be re-formed.
Independently of the political framework – whether NATO or the EU – there’s no indication that a base of forces to form parallel structures exists, despite expectations that France will continue lobbying for a higher level of EU independence on the defence front
Gauging the potential of an army isn’t easy, but let’s use one example to illustrate the atmosphere in the EU: France reduced its number of tanks to 222 units of Leclerc battle tanks. In comparison, on paper, the Serbian Army has 277 tanks in its units. Of course, for deeper analysis it is necessary to also include training parameters, technical support and maintenance, which are resources that don’t favour Serbia. It is nevertheless clearly unusual that France, which tends towards interventionism, has fewer tanks than Serbia.
We are now on the cusp – independently of the French insistence on the EU’s role in the domain of defence – of the process of rapidly renewing the military resources of EU members (i.e., NATO). The organising of the massing of forces against Russia is based for now on NATO structures, with the unified multinational battalions formed in the three Baltic states and Poland set to grow quickly into units of the rank of brigade or even division. NATO has its forces deployed in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. There is no sense of the existence of the EU’s military mechanisms, which are swamped by NATO activities focused on the “Russian front”. Independently of the political framework – whether NATO or the EU – this all relates to the same battalions and there’s no indication that a base of forces to form parallel structures exists.
