Serbia accepts the political reality and negotiations on the status of Kosovo, but those in power in Serbia simultaneously want the image of being powerful and dangerous, which is essential for them to avoid a loss of confidence in their real capacity. At the same time, the far more complex issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina is ignored
The dramatic tones linked to Kosovo are primarily an issue of propaganda and the internal political needs of the authorities in Belgrade, and they create the image that they are ready to do whatever is required, including the use of force, to protect national interests. At the same time, we have their counterparts in Priština, who also need to project an image of being determined patriots.
The Kosovo issue is a medium of daily political propaganda, which is precisely why it is important to note that showing 155mm self-propelled howitzers near the administrative line is a media pose. When it comes to our side, the Serbian side, I support the show of force provided it is a tool of foreign policy at a specific juncture. Showing force is not a taboo topic, but that is not to be abused in the media for the needs of domestic politics.
If we observe the bigger picture, we see that there is communication between the Serbian authorities and the Serbian Army with KFOR, with KFOR presenting itself and accepting its role as the only relevant interlocutor when it comes to the security of Kosovo, which is of course reassuring and indicates that it is acting responsibly and that there are no indications of the situation becoming radicalised. On the flip side, strong pressure is being exerted on domestic public opinion with images intended to show that the army and the police are just a step away from war.
In NATO over the last few months, whenever the war in Ukraine is mentioned, the next sentence makes mention of the situation in the Balkans, but with the focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Of course, this is presumably because it is politically correct for the public promotion of people from the non-governmental sector, then to a number of our fellow analysts and journalists, to insist on Russian pressure, on the Russian factor. That is valid, but it is by no means as radical as our Balkan problems actually being our problems. We have inherited hatred and unresolved conflicts from the past.
Unlike Kosovo, elements of unfavourable assessments exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The wars of the 1990s were actually stopped through truces, provisional solutions, none of which are stable. And here B-H is seen as the main problem. In NATO over the last few months, whenever the war in Ukraine is mentioned, the next sentence makes mention of the situation in the Balkans, but with the focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina. That’s because the peace of the Dayton Accords left sharp national divisions, and a state that never became functional. And there one can see a postponed conflict at a high level, in contrast to the situation regarding Kosovo, where day-to-day politics mainly dominates. Of course, here we must add the caveat that the possibility always exists that control of the situation could be lost in this dangerous game being played.
A large section of our public is convinced that foreigners create wars; that a foreign factor is in control, and until 1991 it was neglect that was one of the catalysts for the radical development of the situation. Back in 2014, when the crisis in relations between Moscow and Kiev, or between Moscow and the West, began with Crimea and the Donbass, then German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that she wouldn’t want problems to arise in the Balkans in the shadow of that conflict. I believe that today the EU, U.S. and NATO perceive the Western Balkans as a potential area of high security risk, particularly in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, and that they perceive it as risky precisely when pressure is lacking. I am nevertheless convinced that the real risk of armed conflict between Serbia and the Albanian authorities and their formations isn’t high.
