I don’t believe the current U.S. Administration’s policies on Ukraine or our region will change fundamentally. More significant course adjustments could only occur following the next presidential elections, but there we are already entering the domain of remote speculation
The results of the U.S. congressional elections are partly surprising, given the expected better election success of the Republicans. It is, however, encouraging to see the electoral will of voters, a majority of whom rejected Trump’s populism by refusing to give their support to his proposed candidates. Regardless of the final outcome of these elections, I don’t believe the policy of the current administration will change fundamentally as it relates to Ukraine or our region. There could be more “drawing out” in the process of approving future tranches of military and financial aid for Ukraine, but I’m doubtful that the Republicans would dare bring into question America’s restored status as the “arsenal of democracy” in the Western world. More significant course adjustments could only occur following the next presidential elections, but there we are already entering the domain of remote speculation.
The Biden administration’s policy – after the meandering, improvisation and inconsistency of the Trump era – has once again returned to predictability and consistency. The idea of the Serbian world as being probably the most destructive regional project has been reined in and almost banished from the public space
When it comes to our region, the Biden administration’s policy – after the meandering, improvisation and inconsistency of the Trump era – has once again returned to predictability and consistency. The idea of the Serbian world as being probably the most destructive regional project has been reined in and almost banished from the public space. On the other hand, the stability of the region, and consequently its EU integration perspective, are linked much more directly to Russia’s subversive long-term influence.
If Ukraine’s recent military successes represent a prelude to the more significant degrading of Russia’s status as a great power, that will contribute significantly to cooling the situation in the region. It may be paradoxical, but it seems that the policies, values and principles of the EU are the least present in the current foreign policy constellations of a region in which all countries are either formal EU membership candidates or signatories of stabilisation and association agreements with the Union.
