Amid economic and geopolitical instability, Serbia’s student-led protests emerge as a rare beacon of principled idealism, though they lack support from a cohesive or sustained opposition movement
Serbia was among the early harbingers of contemporary populism, standing at the forefront of the phenomenon in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The populist agenda has today evolved to become a global trend, embodied by authoritarian-leaning leaders such as presidents Trump, Putin, Orbán, Fico and Erdoğan. In parallel, far-right parties across Germany, France and the UK have gained strength by blending nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric with selective social welfare agendas.
In this broader context, the autocratic tendencies of Serbia’s president are neither novel nor exceptional. They conform to a well-established global pattern, despite the constitutional limits formally placed on presidential power. In that light, the individual backgrounds or professional qualifications of ministers in the newly formed Serbian government are marginally consequential. The prevailing political model operates independently of such credentials.
The recent U.S. sanctions imposed on NIS, the country’s dominant oil and gas company, remain a source of significant uncertainty. The outcome of ongoing negotiations is difficult to predict. However, if fully enforced, the sanctions could deliver a serious blow to Serbia’s already vulnerable economy. In comparison, the introduction of U.S. tariffs on Serbian goods is of limited consequence, given the modest volume of bilateral trade between the two countries.
While the students’ symbolic bike ride to Strasbourg is unlikely to alter the EU’s stance on Serbia, it could boost the movement’s visibility among the Serbian diaspora
Against this backdrop of economic unease and geopolitical instability—both domestically and internationally—the student-led protests in Serbia stand out as a rare beacon of principled idealism. Their persistent calls for accountability, the rule of law and the protection of human rights represent a vital, if isolated, expression of civic resistance. Yet this energy remains largely unaccompanied by any coordinated or sustainable form of political engagement from the parliamentary opposition.
This disconnect may partly explain the caution shown by EU officials and leaders of member states. Rather than risk provoking Serbia’s leadership into a more openly pro-Russian orientation—or into intensified meddling in neighbouring states—they continue to uphold the logic of “stabilocracy”: tolerating democratic backsliding in exchange for regional predictability.
In this climate, the students’ symbolic bike ride to Strasbourg is unlikely to alter the EU’s strategic posture toward Serbia in any fundamental way. However, it may succeed in amplifying the visibility of the student movement within the Serbian diaspora and among segments of EU public opinion. That, in itself, is not insignificant.
