“The European idea is based on a triptych: competition that stimulates; cooperation that strengthens; solidarity that unites,” Jacques Delors would often reiterate, expressing his unwavering faith in the original concept of integration – something he once called an “unidentified political object.” Though an old idea dressed in new clothes, the notion of “Europe ’92” succeeded above all thanks to a very concrete programme and its rigorous implementation
Although he was never a president or a prime minister of his own country, Jacques Delors (1925–2023) will be remembered as one of the most significant French political figures of his generation, and a great European whose influence shaped today’s European Union more than perhaps any other politician of his time. He served as President of the European Commission for nearly a decade (1985–1994), a period during which the European Community – previously a primarily economic union of Western Europe – was transformed into the European Union, with ambitions to encompass the entire continent. The only Commission president to serve three terms, Delors played a pivotal role in formulating and securing key decisions and pioneering policies that led to the creation of the single market, the Schengen Agreement, the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the euro, as well as the EU’s expansion to Mediterranean and EFTA countries and the opening of membership prospects for Central and Eastern European states.
Nothing at first glance suggested that history was about to take a decisive turn on that day in January 1985, when this former French finance minister, bank official, Christian trade unionist, and lifelong socialist first stepped into the grey corridors of the Berlaymont building – the Brussels seat of the European Commission. His predecessor, the now largely forgotten Luxembourg politician Gaston Thorn, had left the institution in a state of one of its cyclical spells of euro-pessimism, the kind we are familiar with even today. A self-made man and descendant of peasant stock from Corrèze in central France, Delors had built a career in France’s elitist public administration through hard work and an exceptional sense of duty – something he soon brought to the slumbering Brussels bureaucracy. Yet this industrious man, a brilliant organiser with gentle manners and a somewhat reserved demeanour, was always much more than a successful technocrat. He was a politician of conviction and integrity, a socialist with a deep sense of solidarity and empathy, and a pro-European activist with a clear vision.
Just months after his arrival in Brussels, one of the most effective political and communication campaigns in the EU’s history was launched – “Europe ’92” – echoing the spirit of Jean Monnet and the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community. It was an old idea, but reframed in Delors’ style: a plan comprising over 300 measures aimed at removing border, administrative and other barriers in order to achieve the “four freedoms” of movement and to complete the “internal” (or single) market.
“The European idea is based on a triptych: competition that stimulates; cooperation that strengthens; solidarity that unites,” Delors would often repeat, reaffirming his belief in a form of integration he once dubbed “an unidentified political object.” Though an old idea dressed anew, “Europe ’92” triumphed thanks to a concrete programme and strict implementation.
The plan succeeded beyond expectations and resonated widely across Europe at the time. Even neutral EFTA countries applied for membership. With changes unfolding in Eastern Europe and German reunification, France and Germany – led by Mitterrand and Kohl – proposed the creation of a political union. History was accelerating at a frantic pace.
DELORS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
“It was our greatest failure,” Delors remarked with a note of self-criticism, referring to the “Yugoslav drama” that during his term in Brussels had turned into tragedy. In his Memoirs (2004), co-written with journalist Jean-Louis Arnaud, Delors recounted a visit to Belgrade in May 1991, alongside European Council President Jacques Santer. It was one of the final attempts by Brussels to offer financial aid and the prospect of closer association with the Community in a bid to prevent the complete disintegration of the federation. Delors described meetings with federal officials Ante Marković and Budimir Lončar, as well as individual and joint discussions with the presidents of the six republics. The republican leaders remained divided.
During a joint meeting, Slobodan Milošević, Delors wrote, symbolically moved his chair to sit on the opposite side of the table from the other five presidents. “We returned from Belgrade with the uneasy feeling that our economic offers would not suffice to prevent serious incidents,” he noted.
“There is a deliberate, systematic attempt to weaken Europe,” warned the committed European federalist in 2004, ahead of the EU’s protracted polycrisis – words that today appear truly prophetic
Although SFR Yugoslavia had, in the decades before the 1991 catastrophe, led the way among former socialist states in cooperation with the EEC – even concluding an ambitious cooperation and association agreement in 1980 – and was objectively in a position to begin deeper integration earlier than Poland or Hungary, everything collapsed rapidly. Delors further described Germany’s unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the failure of the Yugoslavia Conference, and his speech in August 1992, in which he stated that only military intervention could stop the civil war and the continuing bloodshed. Once the conflict erupted and Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, the EU’s primary goal became to avoid a negative domino effect across the continent. “The breakup of Yugoslavia is a tragedy – the collapse of the European Community would be a catastrophe,” Delors summarised the consensus among the Community’s member states at the time.
In December 1991, almost simultaneously with the dramatic events in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, establishing the European Union. A new Europe was being born – unified, while former socialist federations were falling apart.
NOTRE EUROPE
After stepping down as Commission President in 1995 and declining to re-enter French national politics (he turned down calls to run for president), Jacques Delors devoted himself, much like Jean Monnet before him, to supporting European projects and ideals from behind the scenes.
“There is a deliberate, systematic attempt to weaken Europe,” warned the committed European federalist in 2004, on the eve of the EU’s prolonged “polycrisis” – words that today seem strikingly prophetic. It was the end of the euro-euphoria era.
“Where there is no vision, the people perish,” he liked to quote the old proverb.
Delors continued to observe and comment on the ups and downs of the European project in the opening decades of the 21st century: from the success of the euro to the great financial crisis; from the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice to the failure of the proposed “European Constitution” and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty; from the “big bang” enlargement to the rise of populism and Brexit.
“If there is no such thing as permanent victory, there is also no eternal defeat,” this wise man would say, perhaps thinking of other lifelong passions of his, such as basketball and cycling.
Though somewhat faded, Delors’ vision remains present – in both the strategy and practice of the European Commission, and in the work of institutions he helped to found, such as the Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, which marked the centenary of his birth with a conference titled “Strengthening the Single Market for a Sustainable and Prosperous Future for Citizens.”
“People do not fall in love with a single market… the European project must also have a soul,” Delors often said, advocating European solidarity, regional development policies, social measures and the fight against growing inequality.