The need to accelerate Ukraine’s EU integration, coupled with incentives to fortify the union’s international geopolitical “might”, as well as the general influence and interest of the U.S. In stabilising southeast Europe, will lead to a somewhat greater and faster opening up of the EU towards the countries of the Western Balkans during the decade ahead
The council of the European Union’s swift acceptance of the EU membership candidate status of both Ukraine and Moldova, but also Georgia, under the conditions of war in Ukraine and dramatic shifts in geopolitical relations within Europe, provided an implicit indication of historical “unfinished business” in the Western Balkans. In this sense, the situation today in Southeast Europe arose, among other things, as a consequence of a series of geostrategic omissions/errors made by the EU over the course of this century to date.
They include the following: a de facto slowdown, or the deferring of the enlargement process following the “big bang” expansion of the Union from 15 to 27 member states in the 2004-2007 period; the territorial “crumbling” of the enlargement process when it comes to the once unified socioeconomic area of the former Yugoslavia, i.e. the application of the “frigate” principle instead of a collective approach (like the one applied in the case of the CEE region); this separation was particularly harmful in a geopolitical sense, given the need for the parallel EU integration of Croatia and Serbia; unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s independence without the prior consent of the country to which it belongs (Serbia) – with which all previously accepted principles of respect for national borders were contradicted, including the views of the Badinter Arbitration Committee – had a significant and long-term impact on Serbia’s internal and international situation and consequently possible instability in the region, or across Europe more broadly (i.e., on Russia’s views regarding the issue of the inviolability of national borders).
Serbia’s full EU integration will not be possible without deeper political changes and reforms to Belgrade’s current centrist, autocratic regime
The government in Belgrade itself has had a significant influence over the slow dynamics of enlargement negotiations when it comes to Serbia, given that the government’s initial enthusiasm – brought by the opening of accession negotiations in 2013- 2014 – quickly gave way to a specific “enlargement fatigue” that manifested internally through a slowing down or abandoning of reforms and a strengthening of the klepto-corruption system, but also an effort on the international front to maintain some kind of policy of friendship in relations with both Russia and China.
The need to accelerate Ukraine’s EU integration, coupled with incentives to fortify the Union’s international geopolitical “might”, as well as the general influence and interest of the U.S. in stabilising Southeast Europe, will lead to a somewhat greater and faster opening up of the EU towards the countries of the Western Balkans during the decade ahead. This will most likely be realised in the form of a “third round” of European integration, i.e., some kind of partial membership with full integration in certain sectors (market, energy, transport, science and education etc.), alongside additional financial incentives from the EU. However, Serbia’s full EU integration will not be possible without deeper political changes and reforms to Belgrade’s current centrist, autocratic regime.
