The keys to serbia’s foreign policy are in the hands of Brussels to a large extent, through its policy towards serbia and the Western Balkans. The more the EU is in a position to articulate a clear enlargement policy, the fewer incentives there will be for belgrade to pursue its interests through others.
As a country which has a main strategic aim that remains joining the European Union, which has an economy that’s predominantly orientated towards Europe and where Brussels plays a key role in mediating between Belgrade and Priština, as well as in defining relations within the Western Balkans, Serbia must primarily weigh up its policy in relations to Brussels. However, although in 2018 the country adopted the so-called “credible perspective for enlargement” – a policy that opens the prospects of the Western Balkan countries acceding to the EU by 2025 – the EU continues to send, in the best cases, mixed signals about whether it is really ready to turn this vision into reality. This uncertainty is the result of internal dynamics in the EU, and to a lesser extent due to the uncertain steps with which Serbia synchronises its regulations and practises with those of Europe. Brussels has also proven to be an ineffective mediator in the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, in which some of the aspects of the Brussels Agreement signed in 2013 that are most important for Serbia remain a dead letter on paper.
Thus, Brussels is opening the door wide to the government in Belgrade to secure its credibility and legitimacy, as well as its interests on the Kosovo issue and in the wider foreign policy field, through relations with other important external players, instead of with the support of the EU and the major European countries.
It is in the light of this key that we should also view relations with China and Russia. As long as the EU doesn’t show that it’s ready and able to secure Serbia’s interests in Kosovo – which have been significantly softened and modified through openness to a “compromise in which both sides would lose something” – the support that these two countries give Serbia is essential to preserving Serbia’s position on this issue that is central to the country. Likewise, this also explains Belgrade’s readiness to use the importance and influence of the United States through the Washington Agreement, despite the clearly limited duration of the Trump administration at that time.
If the trajectory of EU-China and U.S.- China relations continues to worsen, that will hamper Serbia’s efforts to build on the positive momentum achieved through economic cooperation to date and the important role China is playing in efforts to overcome the covid-19 epidemic in Serbia
Apart from strengthening its position with regard to Kosovo, maintaining relations with Moscow, Beijing and Washington gives credibility to the current government by validating the image it wants to project for domestic needs – as a reputed partner of the great powers. Moreover, the economic dimension of relations with China, and in particular the commissioning of lapsed and important economic factors, such as the Smederevo Steelworks and the former RTB Bor mining complex, along with the improvement of transport and other infrastructure, represents great support for the efforts of the current authorities to position themselves as the bearers of economic progress. These are significant resources that are being made available during years when there are no similar resources available from the EU itself. In that sense, the so-called “return” of the United States to the region, including the announcement of infrastructure investments in Serbia – despite being the product of the global game against China that this country is playing – can only be in the interest of Belgrade if the Biden administration continues on Trump’s path and if it doesn’t give support to Priština’s desire to further formalise independence without and beyond dialogue with Serbia.
An important factor will also be represented by the trajectory of EU-China relations. If those relations continue to worsen despite the recently signed agreement on economic cooperation, which is seen as a possible turning point, it should be expected that Brussels will ramp up the pressure it exerts on Serbia to reduce its relations with China, and the same can also possibly be expected from Washington. This will hinder Serbia’s efforts to build on the positive momentum achieved through economic cooperation to date and the important role that China is playing in efforts to overcome the COVID-19 epidemic in Serbia.
